THE TRADITIONAL “POSITIONAL BARGAINING” MODEL IN DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS

Authors

  • Absamatov Mirodil Student, Third Year, International Relations Program International Islamic Academy of Uzbekistan
  • Musurman Xurramov PhD, Department of International Relations

Keywords:

positional bargaining, principled negotiation, zero-sum game, cooperative strategy, competitive strategy, international relations, negotiation process, negotiation strategy, diplomacy.

Abstract

This study provides a scholarly examination of the differences between the traditional “positional bargaining” model and the modern “principled negotiation” approach. It analyzes the main characteristics of positional bargaining, including competitive behavior, a low level of cooperation, unwillingness to compromise, and a weak sense of collective responsibility. The study also examines potential problems arising from the application of this model in international diplomatic negotiations, as well as the factors affecting its effectiveness. The article substantiates the need to develop cooperation-based approaches to improve the effectiveness of negotiations in the context of contemporary international relations.

References

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Published

2026-11-08

How to Cite

Absamatov Mirodil, & Musurman Xurramov. (2026). THE TRADITIONAL “POSITIONAL BARGAINING” MODEL IN DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS. NAZARIY VA AMALIY FANLARDAGI USTUVOR ISLOHOTLAR VA ZAMONAVIY TA’LIMNING INNOVATSION YO’NALISHLARI, 3(11), 47–51. Retrieved from https://innovativepublication.uz/index.php/NUZY/article/view/6585